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IN THE SUP·REME COURr 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH and STATE ROAD 
COMl\'IISSION OF UTAH, 
Defen.darnts. 
ease 
No. 9727 
DEFENDANT'S' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant, State Road Commission of Utah, on 
March 6, 1962, filed its petition with the Public Service 
Commission of Utah requesting the issuance of an Order: 
1. Authorizing the elimination of the grade crossing 
where the Rio Grande railroad spur track crosses U. S. 
Highways 50-6 in Utah County by separation of the high-
way and railroad grades. 
~. Authorizing the construction of an overpass over 
the tracks and right of way of this spur track known as 
1 
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Gomex spur of the Rio Grande railroad in Utah County, 
Utah. 
-, \ ~· ... 
3. Directing the Rio Grande Railroad Co. to pay its 
commensurate share of the costs and concurrent rail-
road liability for the construction of this portion of 
Project F-028-1, using as a criteria for establishing a 
fair and equitable portion of these costs, Highway Laws 
Public Law 85-767, 85th Congress dated August 27, 1958, 
Title 23, Sec. 1, Chap. 1, Sec. 130 (b), which provides that 
10 per cent of the total costs he assessed against the 
Railroad as consideration for the benefits derived by the 
Railroad. 
This Public Law, supra, has been clarified by 
the United States Department of Commerce, Bu-
reau of Public Roads, Policy and Procedure memo 
21-10(3) dated July 21, 1960, Par. 5h (1) (a) states 
(in connection with Federal-aid Highways under 
the National System) ''All crossings of railroads 
and highways at grade are to be eliminated, where 
there is full control of access regardless of the 
volume of railway or highway traffic.'' 
Paragraph 5b (1) (c) states: ''A project for 
the elimination of an existing intersection of a 
railway and highway at grade shall be considered 
of no cognizable ben,efit to the railroad and the 
railroad shall not be held liable for any part of the 
cost of the project, when all of the following con--
ditions exist at the time the project is undertaken: 
1. The project is undertaken as part of the con-
version of an existing highway to a freeway with 
full access." (This highway is not being con-
structed as a freeway.) 
2. ''Freeway'' - not applicable. 
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3. ''The railway-highway crossing ; involv.e$ 
only a spur track ... '' 
4. ''There is not inforce either an agreement 
between the State Highway Department and the 
railroad or any order rendered by the State. Pu~ 
lie Utilities Commission ... providing fov th~ 
elimination of the railway-high'\Vay crossi,n~.'' 
(There is no agreement, but there is an order of 
the Public Service Commission of Utah, dated 
May 23, 1962.) 
5. ''Automatic signal devices'' -not applicable. 
The above clearly sets forth that all five of the 
above conditions must exist in order that there 
may be no cognizable benefit to the railroad. It is 
clear that in the matter a.t Bar, conditions 1, 2, 4, 
and 5 do not exist. (emphasis added) 
The Public Service Commission of Utah and the State 
Road Commission of Utah, hereinafter referred to as 
defendants, admit and agree with the Statement of 
Facts set forth in plaintiff's brief, with the following 
specific exceptions and additions. 
The testimony at the hearing before the Public Serv-
ice Commission developed a definite controversy over the 
location of the 40-acre line bounding the property plain-
tiff allegedly conveyed to the Illinois Powder Company in 
1940; the line to which plaintiff alleges its property ex-
tends at present. Testimony offered by defendant State 
Road Commission of Utah that the said line was accu-
rately located on maps furnished by the Utah Railway 
Company was equally strong as that offered by plaintiff. 
This indicated the line to be somewhat south of that shown 
on the maps presented by plaintiff. 'l'herefore, the as sump-
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tion by plaintiff that its current maps accurately reflect 
the proper location of the line is without foundation and 
plaintiff's allegation as to the correct location of this 
40-acre line is specifically denied. The point made by 
plaintiff as to the location of this line is immaterial under 
the law concerning the main issue at bar. However, the 
testimony a.t (R. 65) does show that the conveyance to the 
Illinois Powder Company by plaintiff conveyed all own-
ership to this land, except a two hundred foot (200 ft.) 
right of way reserved to plaintiff. 
Witness Johnson of the Bureau of Public Roads was 
qualified with respect to knowledge of the Bureau of Pub-
lic Roads regulations which would enable him to render 
professional testimony regarding the existence of aml 
interpretation of Bureau of Public Roads Policy and Pro-
cedure Memoranda. He was not called or qualified as an 
expert on tract lands, ownership rights, railroad opera-
tion over a spur track, or to guess as to who might receive 
benefits from an overpass built over and in the vicinity 
of a disputed boundary line. His testimony that "it 
seemed to him that the Powder Company might benefit'' 
(R. 42) is of no significance. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
THE POWER AND JURISDICTION OF THE 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
IS COMPREHENSIVE AND EXTENDS TO 
THE APPORTIONMENT OF COSTS OF A 
GRADE SEPARATION OVER THE RAIL-
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ROAD SPUR TRACK INVOLVED IN THIS 
CASE AS WELL AS ANY OTHER SPUR 
TRA(~K OH SEGMENT OF ANY RAILROAD. 
It has been grnerally held that a railroad company 
may be requirrd, without any violation of its constitu-
tional rights to reconstruct, relocate or eliminate a high-
wny erossi11g, or to bear or contribute to the expense 
tlwrcof; at least where such action is not arbitrary or 
unreasonable. (109 ALR 769 citing dozens of eases in 
support thereof.) 
It is admitted that the power of the Public Serviee 
Commission is derived from statute and not inherent. We 
agTt'e that Subsection 2 of Section 54-4-15 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, provides for jurisdiction of the Public 
Service Commission over subject highway grade separa-
tions, and empowers the Public Service Commission, 
wht>rt) in its judgment it would be practieal, to require a 
HPparation of grades of a highway over a railroad and to 
apportion the expense of such separation between the 
railroad and the governmental subdivision involved. 
"Sec. 54-4-15(2). The commission shall have the 
exclusive power to determine and prescribe the 
manner including the particular point of crossing 
and the terms of installation, operation, mainte-
nance, use and protection of each crossing of ... 
a public road or highway by a railroad ... and to 
alter or abolish any such crossing ... and to re-
quire where in its judgment it would be practi-
cable, a separation of grades at any such cro.ssing 
. . . and to prescribe the terms upon which such 
separation shall be made and the proportions in 
which the e:s:pense of the alteration ar abolition of 
such crossings or the separation of such grades 
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shall be divided between the railroad ... and the 
state, cormty, municipality or other public author-
ity in interest. 
"See. 54-4-15(13). Whenever the commission 
shall find that public convenience and necessity 
demand ·the establishment, creation or construc-
tion of a crossing of a street or highway over, 
under or upon the tracks or lines of any public util-
ity, the commission may by order, decision, rule or 
decree require the establishment, construction or 
creation of such crossing, and such crossing shall 
thereupon become a public highway and crossing.'' 
It is further submitted that whether or not the plain-
tiff had entered into a conveyance of land and trackage 
agreement, the Public Service Commission upon applica-
tion of the Powder Company could, under the authority 
vested in said commission under Section 54-4-11 Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, have ordered the plaintiff to pro-
vide such a spur. Moreover, Section 54-4-1 provides: 
''The commission is hereby vested with the power 
arnd jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every 
public utility in this state ... and to do all things, 
whether herein specifically designated or in addi-
tion thereto, which are necessary or convenient in 
the exercise of such power and jurisdiction.'' (Em-
phasis added) 
The aforementioned jurisdiction and power dele-
gated by statute to the Public Service Commission is ex-
panded and clarified in 54-4-8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
which states with reference to apportioning of costs 
that-
'''Whenever the commission shall find that addi-
tions, extensions, repairs or improvements to or 
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ehanges in the existing ... facilities of any public 
utility ... ought reasonably to be made, or that 
nPw structures ought to be erected to promote the 
s(•euritv or convenience .of its employees or the 
publie ~ .. the commission shall make and serve a.n 
order <lirecting that such ... structures be ereeted 
in the manner and within the time specified in said 
order. If any ... structures which the commission 
has ordered to be erected require joint action ... 
same shall be made a.t their joint cost ; .. If such 
public utilities shall fail to file with the commis-
sion a statement that agreement has been made 
for division or apportionment of the costs or ex-
pense of such . . . structures, the commission shall 
have authority after further hearing, to make an 
order fixing the proportion of such cost ... '' 
The foregoing clearly shows the intent of the legis-
lature to empower the Public Service Commission, after 
fair and reasonable consideration of the facts, to appor-
tion the costs of this over-crossing of plaintiff's operation 
in any manner which appears just and equitable. Since 
this Utah law considerably predates the Policy and Pro-
cedure memos of the Bureau of Public Roads, U. S .. De-
partment of Commerce, the Public Service Commission 
of Utah has had the power since the enactme~t of our 
first Utah statute on this subject, and now has the power 
to apportion such costs in any manner which l.s fai1~, even 
if this results in requiring the plaintiff railroad to pay 
100% of the cost of the overpass. The Bureau criteria 
was adopted by the Public Service Commission in the 
spirit of genuine consideration and fairness to the 
Railroad. 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In one of the case~ cited in plaintiff's brief, Denver 
& Rio Grande Wes:tern Ra.ilroad v. City O!nd County of 
Denver, 250 U.S. 241, the court stated: 
''The scope of power (of a utilities commission, 
etc.) and instances of its application are shown in 
the decisions sustaining regulations (a) requiring 
railway companies at their own expense to abro-
gate grade erossings by elevating or depressing 
their tracks and putting bridges or viaducts at· 
public crossings, Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. 
Duluth, 208 U.S. 583 ; Chicago Milwaukee & St. 
Paul Railroad v. Minneapolis, 232 U.S. 430, etc.; 
(.b) requiring a railroad company a.t its own ex-
pense to cha:nge the location of a track and also 
elevate it as a means of making travel on a high-
way safe, New York, ete., Railroad Co. v. Bristol, 
151 U.S. 556; Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. 
City of Goldsboro 232 U.S. 548; Chicago, Milwau-
kee & St. Paul Railroad v. City of Minneapolis 
232 U.S. 430." (Emphasis added) 
Many cases involving Public Service and Public Util-
ities Commissions have held that the Hoard or Commis-
sion has the jurisdiction to fix the cost, (Lehigh Valley 
. Railroad Co. v. Board of Public Utilities Commission., 278 
U.S. 24) and they do not differentiate between a spur 
track and other railroad tracks. 
There are many definitions of railroads, some of 
whieh appear to be constructed as a matter of conven-
ience and interpreted likewise. Subsection (9) of Sec. 
54-2-1, U.C.A., 1953, quoted in plaintiff's brief, is a defi-
nition when the section is construed as a whole, not merely 
taking therefrom those words which are convenient. A 
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more adequate and pure definition may be found in 
Black's TJegal Dictionary at page 1424 -
''Railroad, a road or way on which iron or steel 
rails are laid for wheels to. run on, for the convey-
ance of heavy loa.ds in cars or carriages or car-
riages propelled by steam or other motive power 
... incident to the possession and ownership of 
which important franchises and rights affecting 
the publie are attached. (Muskogee Electric Trac-
tion Co. v. Doering, 70 Olda. 21.) 
''In a strictly accurate sense, it is a generic term, 
and includes all kinds of railroads, whether street 
railways, horse car lines, electric trolley lines, sub-
urban lines, or steam railroads engaged in general 
transportation. Columbia Ry., Gas and Electric 
Co. D.C.S.C. 24 Fed. 2d 831.'' 
It would appear reasonably certain that plaintiff's 
railroad and spur track would fall into one of the above 
categories, particularly since Black's Law Dictionary··. 
at page 1574 further defines "Spur track. A short track 
leading from a line of railway and connected. with it at 
one end ... Simons Brick Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 
182 Cal. 230. '' 
1 rrespective of the conveyance of land to and the 
trackage agreement with the American Cyanamid Cor-
poration entered into by plaintiff railroad twenty years 
ago, there was no testimony entered, nor is there any evi-
denee to the effed, that the Cyanamid. Corporation ever 
intended to own or operate a railroad; apply for or secure 
a franehise for such an operation, or purchase any rail-
road rolling equipment. Consequently, the said Cyanamid 
Corporation has not secured any rights affecting the pub_; 
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lie which plaintiff railroad has in connection with the 
operation of this ·spurtra.ck to the same degree as it has 
in connection with the operation of its main line. 
A railroad company receives its charter and fran-
chise subject to the implied right of the state to estab-
lish and open such streets and highways over and across 
its right of way as public convenience and necessity may 
from time to time require. That right on the part of the 
state attaches by implication of law to the franchise of 
the railroad company and imposes upon it an obligation 
to construct and maintain at its own expense suitable 
crossings. (SeeOhicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad 
v. Minneapolis, 232 U.S. 430, supra; People v. Williamson 
County, 286 Ill. 44.) 
There would appear to be no question whatsoever as 
to the intent of the pertinent sections of our Utah Stat-
utes, construed as a whole, with respect to the Public 
Service Commission having complete jurisdiction and 
power to investigate a situation such as the one outlined 
herein, and, after a fair and impartial hearing, render 
the ruling made herein in the interest of the public bet-
terment and safety; and giving full credence to the actual 
benefits to the railroad in avoiding the possible tragedies 
which might occur at this grade crossing. Plaintiff's tech-
nical point with reference to the Public Service Com-
mission.'s jurisdiction over activities which are carried on 
in the public service avoids the general rule which pro-
vides in effect that should other industries locate in the 
general area. in question with the growth of Utah, and 
desire to use this spur track, they would be granted the 
10 
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right under the laws and precedents established in prac-
tically all of our states. Moreover, this private trackage 
aq n~em('nt (not private track) would most likely be set 
nsid(' in a court of competent jurisdiction, should the sit-
untion warrant so doing. (Sec. 54-3-20 U.C.A.). 
TPstimony to the effect that there has been no re-
rorded accident at this grade crossing in twenty-two years 
refl<'<·ts a good record. However, there was further testi-
mony introduced showing that while flagging and flares 
mny have been adequate in the past, conditions have 
<'hang-t.•d to a. point where traffic has now increased to as 
mnny as -H27 vehicles per day, or an average of 2,855 
pl'r day for the entire year of 1960, passing over this 
crossing, many of them at a. high rate of speed. (R. 
~)-10,34.) 
'rhe project of overpassing plaintiff's railroad spur 
track was proposed by defendant, State Road Commis-
sion, after a careful engineering study on how to most 
effectively and efficiently to improve U. S. Highway 
50-6; accommodate a greatly increased amount of high-
speed traffic, and while so doing adopt the method which 
would provide the greatest protection and safety of the 
public. Testimony and exhibits were offered to show 
how the road crosses the railroad track at the bottom of 
a valley which enhances the danger of traffic coming down 
a hill in either direction to the point of crossing. (R. 8, 
Exhibit 1.) 
Consideration was given to the major benefits which 
would accrue to plaintiff by the elimination of a hazard 
of increasing magnitude, and to other benefits accruing 
11 
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to plaintiff in the form of savings in time and money de-
rived through eliminating a railroad gua.rd (R. 18), who 
walks this area periodically and the work of the flagmen. 
When the proposal was submitted to plaintiff, it refused 
to enter into an agreement embodying a provision under 
which plaintiff would contribute a small percentage of 
the costs of this ,overpass project. 
When the proposal was submitted to defendant, Pub-
lic Service Commission, and set down for a hearing, plain-
tiff made no objection to the jurisdiction of the Public 
Service Commission knowing very well that the petition 
prayed for an order requiring plaintiff to pay a percent-
age of the costs of the overpass, and that the Public 
Service Commission acting under its statutory power had, 
on previous occasions apportioned such costs. 
Defendant, Public Service Commission, carefully con.-
sidered all of the evidence, including testimony of Mr. Jim 
West, District Engineer, District No. 2, for the Utah Stat~ 
Highway Department. Mr. West testified that the only 
alternative to constructing the overpass was the lowering 
of the high places on the hig?-way on both sides of the de-
pression, which would be excessively expensive. (R. 10) 
Such a change in the road surface, particularly at the east 
end, would require excavation of the highway to a depth 
of twenty-five feet, mostly through solid rock formation. 
The construction of the overpass will dispense with 
the necessity of stopping the train before crossing the 
highway, and of stationing flagmen to warn approaching 
highway traffic. 
12 
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I~ 
Defendant, Public Service Commission, having full 
jurisdiction of this matter, and being fully advised in 
the premises, after due and careful. consideration, and in 
the spirit of fairness and reasonableness, issued its Order 
n~quiring plaintiff to contribute to the cost of the con-
struction of the overpass. 
The Order of the Public Service Commission dated 
~lny 23, 1962, should be affirmed by the Honorable Su-
preme Court of Utah. 
U mlcr a statute providing for actions against the 
~Hate Public Service Commission to set aside or modify 
an order of the Commission .on the ground that it is un-
reasonable or unlawful, the decisions of the Commission, 
while subject to review, are prima facie correct. (Hessey 
v. Cap·itol Transit Co., 193 Md. 265.) 
In the case of Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. 
Illinois Commerce Commission, 326 Ill. 625, the court 
held: 
''A railroad is a public utility, and in accepting its 
franchise from the state, agrees to submit to all 
burdens, conditions and regulations imposed by 
the state with reference to its tracks and their in-
tersections with highways necessary to promote 
and secure safety of the traveling public. 
''Reviewing courts will examine facts on which an 
order of the Commerce Commission relocating a 
highway at a railroad crossing is based and will 
sustain such .order, if there is substantial evidence 
to support it." 
The great weight of authority shown in cases of a 
similar nature in all jurisdictions in the United States 
13 
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clearly establish that the Supreme Court of the state will 
uphold the ruling of Public Service and Utilities Com-
missions, unless such rulings are capricious, arbitrary 
and unreasonable. The Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 
54-7-16 states: 
'' ... The review shall not be extended further than 
to determine whether the commission has regu-
larly pursued its authority, including a determi-
nation of whether the order or decision under 
review violates any right of the petitioner under 
the Constitution of the United States or of the 
State of Utah. The findings and conclusions of the 
commission on questions of fact shall be final and 
shall not be subject to review .... '' 
In Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, 99 Utah 28, and Los .Angeles & Salt Lake Ra,il-
road Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 80 Ut. 455, it was 
held that the Supreme Court is bound by findings of the 
commission, when there is evidence to support them, not-
withstanding the wisdom of decision or whether the 
court's conclusions on the evidence would have been the 
same. 
In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, 142 Ut. 465, it was held that the Supreme Court 
will not disturb a decision of the Public Utilities Com-
mission unless such decision is capricious or arbitrary or 
is not based on sufficient competent evidence. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
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WILL BENEFIT FROM THE CONSTRUC-
TION OF THE HIGHWAY OVERPASS. 
The Public Service Commission has given full and 
fair consideration to all aspects of this proposed overpass. 
After making an examination, hearing all testimony pre-
sented a.nd ca.refully weighing the evidence the right, 
proper and equitable decision was reached that plaintiff 
railroad does benefit principally by the elimination of an 
pver increasing hazard. One serious accident could cost 
thl' plaintiff far more money than the relatively nominal 
amount which the Public Service Commission has directed 
plaintiff to pa.y as a small percentage of the construction 
costs of the overpass. 
With the exact location of the 40-acre line admittedly 
in doubt, the Public Service Commission could not deter-
mine whose land the structure would pass over, but the 
point is immaterial. Likewise, it is of no effect that an 
inadequate trackage agreement was entered into by the 
plaintiff railroad, nor that the public will benefit by better 
and safer roads. Further, the point of whether the 
industry benefits by the structure is not at issue. Whether 
or not the American Cyanamid Corporation owns the 
trackage, a point which plaintiff persistently presses, 
does not alter the fact that the Company does not own 
or operate a railroad. The Corpora.ti(}n does not own 
an engine and has no franchise to operate a small railroad 
or any part of one. The operation, of the hauling of cars 
over this spur track, which is an off-shoot of plaintiff's 
main line, limited as it may be, is, without a question of 
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doubt, an operation by plaintiff with ·all of its attendant 
duties and responsibilities to the public. 
There is nothing unusual or out of the ordinary about 
this part of the plaintiff's railroad known as a spur. The 
fact that there happens to he only one industry in this 
particular area does not make this a unique situation nor 
prove that it will always remain this way. There is noth-
ing to indicate that the Corporation will not continue to 
purchase this transportation service from the plaintiff as 
it has for the past 20 years. There is, on the other hand, 
positive evidence from common knowledge, of which this 
Honorable Court is requested to take judicial notice, 
that there is ever increasing, faster-moving traffic over 
this highway. This fact alone validates the finding of the 
Public Service Commission, which in its wisdom is act-
ing strictly within its jurisdictional rights and power to 
negate the possibility of tragedy at this crossing, rather 
than wait until fatalities have occurred before taking the 
proper action. 
A railroad may be required, without any violation of 
its constitutional rights, to reconstruct, relocate or elimi-
nate a highway crossing, or to bear or to contribute to 
the expense thereof. (109 ALR 660.) Also see 342 Ill. 646; 
356 Ill. 501; 264 N.Y. 195; 174 N.Y. 852; 190 N. E. 896 
and 190 N. E. 344. 
The exercise of power by the Public Service Com-
mission to order the separation of grades at a crossing 
and apportion the costs thereof is a valid exercise of 
police power by the state. A state may lawfully require 
an interstate railroad to abolish at its own expense high-
16 
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way grade crossings without rega.rd to fin.a~Y~;cial ability, 
if rrasonably required by public safety without violating 
the due pro<'est; of law, the commerce, or contract clauses 
of the F,cdcrnl Constitution or the provision of the State 
eonstitution forbidding the taking of property for public 
ust' without first making compensation therefor. (Evans-
rille T. & T. H. R. Co. v. Gibson County Indiatn,a 199 
~.J1J. 583.) 
Where the Public Service Commission exercised po-
lice power to determine the necessity of a viaduct and 
apportioned percentage of costs, the order of the Com-
mission, made after full hearing, was held to he reason-
able and lawful, and not in violation of any provision of 
the Federal Constitution. (State ex rel Karnsas City 8. R. 
Com. v. Public Service Commission, 325 Mo. 852, 30 S.W. 
~d 112. 
Also, where the Public Service Commission, upon 
applicn tion of the State Highway Commission, ordered a 
separate crossing of concrete to accommodate 2500 to 
4000 ,,chicles daily, the court upheld the Commission 
order; as courts have in many other cases universally 
upheld the Public Service Commission orders. ( 330 
J[o. i29.) 
Although the actual payroll savings realized from the 
time saved by the flagman and the roving guard in the 
area may be relatively inconsequential (or may not he so 
small, if this results in the elimination of some feather-
bedding) these are added benefits which do result for the 
plaintiff. 
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It is respectfully submittedtothelea.rned members of 
this Honorable Court that while the regulation of the 
Bureau of Public Roads is not a part of the substantive 
law, it is one of the reasonable and fair portions of the 
great body of Administrative law which has been devel-
oped in recent years, and should be given cognizance in 
the interest of progress in our great State and N a.tion, 
and for the protection of the public. The Public Service 
Commission of Utah has displayed maximum fairness 
and consideration for the plaintiff in utilizing this min-
imal criteria, when the power and authority of this Com-
mission is far more extensive. 
Summarization of the multitude of cases in point 
clearly shows that the Public Service, Commission was 
fully within its jurisdictional authority in hearing this 
matter; that it has the power to order the separation of 
grades at a crossing and apportion the costs thereof; and 
the only cases in which the rulings of the various Com-
missions have not been sustained are those in which the 
ruling has been clearly proven to be arbitrary, grossly 
unfair and unreasonable by ordering a large amount to 
be contributed, when it was shown that the project could 
have been accomplished less expensively. 
Defendant Road Commission has acted in accordance 
with its duly constituted statutory authority; made every 
effort to obtain agreement with the plaintiff prior to 
bringing this matter to the proper Administrative body, 
the Public Service Commission, under the statutes of 
Utah. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Order of the Public Service Commission should 
he sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General 
FRANKLYN B. MATHESON and 
LEIGH H. HUNT, 
Assistant Attorneys General 
State Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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